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Abstract—Many private BitTorrent communities employ Shar-
ing Ratio Enforcement (SRE) schemes to incentivize users to
contribute their upload resources. It has been demonstrated that
communities that use SRE are greatly oversupplied, i.e., they
have much higher seeder-to-leecher ratios than communities in
which SRE is not employed. The ﬁrst order effect of oversupply
under SRE is a positive increase in the average downloading
speed. However, users are forced to seed for extremely long
times to maintain adequate sharing ratios to be able to start
new downloads. In this paper, we propose a ﬂuid model to
study the effects of oversupply under SRE, which predicts the
average downloading speed, the average seeding time, and the
average upload capacity utilization for users in communities that
employ SRE. We notice that the phenomenon of oversupply has
two undesired negative effects: a) Peers are forced to seed for
long times, even though their seeding efforts are often not very
productive (in terms of low upload capacity utilization); and b)
SRE discriminates against peers with low bandwidth capacities
and forces them to seed for longer durations than peers with high
capacities. To alleviate these problems, we propose four different
strategies for SRE, which have been inspired by ideas in social
sciences and economics. We evaluate these strategies through
simulations. Our results indicate that these new strategies release
users from needlessly long seeding durations, while also being fair
towards peers with low capacities and maintaining high system-
wide downloading speeds.
I. INTRODUCTION
BitTorrent is a popular Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocol for
ﬁle distribution. A key of its success lies in its Tit-For-
Tat (TFT) incentive policy, which works reasonably well in
fostering cooperation among downloading peers (also known
as leechers). However, TFT does not provide any incentive for
peers to remain in the system after the download is complete,
in order to seed the entire ﬁle to others. Therefore, peers are
free to engage in “Hit and Run” behavior, the scenario under
which a peer leaves immediately upon completing a download.
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of so-
called private BitTorrent communities aimed at incentivizing
seeding. These communities employ a private tracker based
method that maintains centralized accounts and records the
sharing ratio of each peer, i.e., the ratio between its total
amount of upload and download. Community administrators
specify some threshold above which all members are required
to maintain their sharing ratios. This mechanism is known
as Sharing Ratio Enforcement (SRE). Community members
whose sharing ratios drop below the threshold are warned
and then banned from downloading, or even expelled from
the community. In this way, it is guaranteed that each peer
provides a certain level of contribution to the community.
The main motivation for implementing SRE is to close
the gap between bandwidth demand and supply as observed
in public communities, where there is signiﬁcantly more
demand than supply [16]. Thus, the basic design goal of
SRE is to achieve higher system-wide downloading speeds by
increasing the bandwidth supply. Several measurement studies
have shown that SRE is very effective in increasing supply [8],
[15], [16], [21]. For instance, [16] reports seeder-to-leecher
ratios that are at least 9 times higher in private communities
than in public ones, while downloading speeds are measured
to be 3-5 times higher. Although apparently the abundant
supply of bandwidth leads to high downloading speed, in
this paper we argue that oversupply also has some negative
effects such as excessively long seeding times that are often
unproductive. Previous work has dealt with analyzing the pros
and cons of SRE schemes from a macroeconomic perspective
[12], [19]. Our analysis considerably expands these works. The
contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We provide a ﬂuid model of private BitTorrent commu-
nities and we consider two user behaviors, lazy-seeding
(seed only the minimum amount as required by SRE)
and over-seeding (seed more than required). We analyze
the inﬂuence of these user behaviors on the performance
of SRE. Besides the downloading speed, we consider
additional performance metrics in our model, namely the
average seeding time and the average upload capacity
utilization. These new performance metrics are highly
relevant to the user experience, but have not been
considered in previous studies (Section III).
2) We show that while achieving high system-wide down-
loading speeds (the reward of SRE), SRE indirectly
forces users to seed for extremely long times, during
which their upload capacity utilizations are quite low
(the punishment of SRE). Further, SRE discriminates
against low-capacity peers and forces them to seed for
longer durations than high-capacity peers (Section V).
3) We propose new strategies for SRE that alleviate the
long and unproductive seeding, while still maintaining
a reasonable system-wide downloading speed. Further-
more, we show that these strategies also reduce the
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Fig. 1. Over-seeding behavior: the CDF of the sharing ratios of peers in
BitSoup.org.
discrimination against low-capacity peers. We evaluate
our strategies using extensive simulations (Sections VI
and VII).
II. SUPPORT FROM REAL WORLD OBSERVATIONS
In order to support our model and analysis of SRE, in
this section we present real world observations of a private
BitTorrent community, BitSoup.org. In this community, users
are required to maintain sharing ratios greater than 0.7.
The measurement trace [7] reports the upload and download
amount, as well as the seeding time of each user. In total,
information on nearly 87,000 users and 13,000 torrents was
obtained during a period of two months. For more details we
refer the reader to [7].
Previous measurement studies have already shown the effec-
tiveness of SRE in boosting the cooperation of users, in terms
of high seeder-to-leecher ratios and long seeding times leading
to high downloading speeds [16], [15], [21], [8]. In addition
to these results, we have two further interesting observations
as follows.
A. Existence of over-seeding behavior
Intuitively, the initial goal of users in a BitTorrent commu-
nity is to download ﬁles. To achieve this, maintaining a sharing
ratio close to the SRE threshold is sufﬁcient. However, we
observe that not all the users behave like this. As shown in
Fig. 1, more than 40% of the users in BitSoup keep sharing
ratios higher than 0.71 and more than 10% of the users keep
them higher than 2. This phenomenon of peers seeding more
than required and achieving sharing ratios that are (much)
higher than the SRE threshold has also been observed in other
communities (e.g., [15]).
From the above observation we abstract two user behaviors
for our later analysis, lazy-seeding and over-seeding. Lazy-
seeding peers seed the minimum amount required by SRE.
They represent the users who are download-oriented, i.e., who
only seed enough to maintain adequate sharing ratios to be
able to start new downloads. On the other hand, over-seeding
peers are deposit-oriented, and always maintain (much) higher
1It can be observed that a signiﬁcant fraction of users have sharing ratios
lower than the SRE threshold. This is because in BitSoup, as well as in other
private communities, users are not immediately banned after their sharing
ratios drop below the threshold: they are given a certain amount of time to
increase their sharing ratios.
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Fig. 2. Unproductive seeding: The CDF of the fraction of idle seeding time
of peers with sharing ratios smaller than 1 in BitSoup.org.
sharing ratios than required. The behavior of such peers may
be triggered by various motivations such as altruism, a desire
to be part of the rich elite of the community, or a habit of
storing sharing ratio for the future.
B. Unproductive seeding
It is clear that in order to achieve high sharing ratios, peers
need to spend considerable amount of seeding time. In the case
of over-seeding peers, long seeding times are to be expected.
However, we observe that even many peers with considerably
small sharing ratios suffer extremely long seeding times, and
a signiﬁcant part of their seeding time is spent idle without
being able to upload anything to others. As a consequence,
they have to wait for a long period until their sharing ratios
are high enough to start new downloads.
Fig. 2 shows the CDF of the fraction of idle seeding time
of peers with sharing ratios smaller than 1 in BitSoup. We can
see that 10% of these peers spend at least half of their seeding
time idle. It should be noted that Fig. 2 only shows the fraction
of idle seeding time. It can be conjectured that the fraction of
seeding time that is not completely idle yet still yields very
low upload capacity utilization, would be much higher. We
hypothesize that this problem of unproductive seeding is due
to the oversupply under SRE.
III. A SIMPLE MODEL FOR PRIVATE BITTORRENT
COMMUNITIES
From the two real world observations described in Section
II, in this section we propose a ﬂuid model to analyze the
effects of SRE as well as the inﬂuence of different user
behaviors on the performance of SRE.
A. Model description
We follow a similar ﬂuid modeling approach as in [18],
[17], [14] and extend it by including SRE and considering
multiple user behaviors derived from real world observations.
The notation we use is shown in Table I.
We consider a private BitTorrent community in which SRE
is adopted and we divide peers into N different classes
according to their upload capacities. Let Ui represent the
upload capacity of peers in class i; to simplify the presentation
let Ui = γiUN . Without loss of generality we assume that
γ1 > γ2 > ... > γN−1 > γN = 1. We further assume that the
download capacity of peers is not a bottleneck.
TABLE I
NOTATION OF OUR BITTORRENT MODEL
Notation Deﬁnition
F the size of the ﬁle shared in a swarm.
α the SRE threshold.
λi the arrival rate of leechers in class i.
Ui the upload capacity of a peer in class i.
ui(t) the average upload speed of a peer in class i at time t,
ui for the steady state.
di(t) the downloading speed of a peer in class i at time t,
di for the steady state.
xi(t) the number of leechers in class i at time t,
xi for the steady state.
yi(t) the number of lazy-seeding seeders in class i at time t,
yi for the steady state.
si the number of over-seeding seeders in class i.
Ti the average seeding time for lazy-seeding peers in class i.
As mentioned earlier we consider two user behaviors: lazy-
seeding and over-seeding. To better understand the effect of
SRE and the over-seeding behavior, we consider an idealized
scenario of a swarm, in which there are si over-seeding peers
with an inﬁnite desired threshold for their sharing ratios. This
implies that they stay in the swarm as seeders indeﬁnitely.
Lazy-seeding peers in class i join the swarm as leechers with
an arrival rate equal to λi and sharing ratios equal to 0. After
they ﬁnish their downloads, they calculate the sharing ratios
they have achieved and, if necessary, they seed in this swarm
until their sharing ratios reach the SRE threshold α. Then they
leave the swarm. Throughout this paper we assume that α < 1,
which is the case for most private communities.
According to TFT, during the leeching process peers favor
other peers who have recently reciprocated to them most.
In this way, peers are roughly clustered according to their
capacities, and peers with similar capacities have similar
performance [17], [14]. Let xi(t) and yi(t) represent the
number of leechers and lazy-seeding seeders in class i at a
particular time t, and let Ti represent the average seeding time
of lazy-seeding peers in class i, then the evolution of xi(t) and
yi(t) can be described as:
dxi(t)
dt
= λi −
xi(t)di(t)
F
,
dyi(t)
dt
=
xi(t)di(t)
F
−
yi(t)
Ti
, i = 1, 2, ..., N,
(1)
where di(t) represents the average downloading speed of peers
in class i at time t. The term xi(t)di(t)/F speciﬁes the rate
at which leechers in class i turn into lazy-seeding seeders and
yi(t)/Ti speciﬁes the leaving rate of lazy-seeding seeders in
class i. In a steady state, dxi(t)/dt = dyi(t)/dt ≡ 0. Letting
xi and yi represent the number of leechers and lazy-seeding
seeders in class i in a steady state, and di represent the average
downloading speed of leechers in class i, from Eq. (1) we have:
λi =
yi
Ti
=
dixi
F
. (2)
Depending on the peers arrival rates (λi) and the number
of over-seeding peers (si), a steady state will be either one of
the two cases described separately below.
B. Oversupplied
When there are a large number of seeders and a small
number of leechers, and seeders cannot always fully utilize
their upload capacities, we can characterize the swarm as over-
supplied. Oversupplied is a typical phase for swarms in private
BitTorrent communities. Given the abundance of seeders, it
is realistic to assume that in an oversupplied swarm seeders
perform most of the uploads. Further considering the piece
availability problem2, peers are more likely to download from
seeders rather than other leechers. A previous measurement
study [16] shows that in two private communities where the
oversupplied situation exists, over 90% of the data comes
from seeders. Accordingly in our model we assume that in
an oversupplied steady state leechers do not contribute upload
capacities. The condition for a swarm to be in an oversupplied
steady state is:
�
i
λiΔF <
�
i
(yi + si)γiUNΔ, (3)
which speciﬁes that within a time interval Δ the total upload
volume that can be provided by all seeders is larger than the
total download volume required by the
�
i λiΔ new leechers
arriving in the same interval.
In such a steady state, once a new peer joins, seeders upload
to it with their full upload capacities and its download will
be ﬁnished quickly. After that, seeders will be idle and wait
for the next upload opportunity. Hence, on average seeders
cannot fully utilize their upload capacities, and because of
the operation of TCP3 their average upload speeds will be
proportional to their upload capacities. Let ui represent the
average upload speed of a peer in class i, then we have
ui = γiuN and the total actual upload volume provided by all
seeders should be equal to the total download volume required
by all leechers, i.e.:
�
i
λiΔF =
�
i
(yi + si)γiuNΔ. (4)
After the download is ﬁnished, a lazy-seeding peer in class
i seeds for a period of length Ti until it achieves the SRE
threshold, i.e., until α = Tiui/F . Substituting yi = λiTi from
Eq. (2) into Eq. (4) we ﬁnd
uN =
(1− α)
�
i λiF�
i siγi
. (5)
Then,
Ti =
αF
ui
=
αF
γiuN
=
α
�
i siγi
(1− α)γi
�
i λi
. (6)
Given Eqs. (3) and (6), we can rephrase the condition for a
swam to be in an oversupplied steady state as:
2The piece availability problem speciﬁes that two connected leechers may
not perform actual download/upload, because they cannot ﬁnd interesting
pieces at each other.
3BitTorrent uses TCP as the transport layer protocol.
�
i siγiUN�
i λiF
> 1− α. (7)
In a private community where the SRE threshold equals α,
when si, Ui, λi, and F fulﬁll the condition of Eq. (7), we
say that the swarm is in an oversupplied steady state. With
a relatively small peer arrival rate (λi) and a large number
of over-seeding seeders (si), peers will experience very low
upload capacity utilizations and extremely long seeding times.
This situation gets even worse for peers with low capacities:
the ratio between the seeding times of two peers is inversely
proportional to the ratio of their upload capacities (γi). More-
over, over-seeding peers with higher upload capacities have
a stronger inﬂuence (proportional to γi) on this situation: the
seeding time incurred by one over-seeding seeder in class i
(i < N ) is equal to that incurred by γi (γi > 1) over-seeding
seeders in class N .
C. Undersupplied
We recognize a swarm to be undersupplied if it is not
oversupplied. We assume that in an undersupplied swarm both
leechers and seeders can fully utilize their upload capacities,
i.e., ui = Ui. This assumption has been validated by previous
studies [17], [14]. In this situation, within a time interval Δ the
total upload volume that can be provided by all peers should
be no larger than the total download volume required by all�
i λiΔ new peers, i.e.:
�
i
λiΔF ≥
�
i
(xi + yi + si)γiUNΔ. (8)
Peers contribute their upload capacities, hence gain sharing
ratios both in the leeching and the seeding process. At the end,
they achieve sharing ratios equal to the SRE threshold, i.e.:
α =
((F/di)Ui + TiUi)
F
⇒ Ti =
αF
Ui
−
F
di
, (9)
where (F/di)Ui represents the upload volume provided by a
leecher in class i in its leeching process.
With xi leechers, yi lazy-seeding seeders, and si over-
seeding seeders in class i in a steady state, the average
downloading speed of a peer in class i can be calculated by
solving the system of equations proposed in our previous work
[14]:
di =
(
�
j Djixj +
�
j Sji(yj + sj))Uj
xi
, (10)
where Dji (Sji) speciﬁes the fraction of upload speed allo-
cated from a leecher (seeder) in class j to leechers in class i
in the BitTorrent protocol.
From Eqs. (2), (9), and (10), we can derive Ti, xi, and
yi. Due to the space constraint we omit their derivation
here. However, simply from Eq. (9) we already have Ti =
αF/Ui−F/di < F/Ui. This implies that in an undersupplied
steady state, an upper bound for the seeding time of a peer
is the ratio between the size of the shared ﬁle and its upload
capacity, which is much better than in an oversupplied steady
state (Eq. (6)).
Further applying Eqs. (9) and (10) to Eq. (8), we rephrase
the condition for a swarm to be in an undersupplied steady
state as follows:
�
i siγiUN�
i λiF
≤ 1− α, (11)
which is exactly the reverse of Eq. (7).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In our theoretical model we consider an idealized scenario
of a private community where there is only one swarm, and
we assume that the over-seeding peers have an inﬁnite desired
threshold for sharing ratios. Taking the insights obtained from
our model, in the following sections we perform simulation-
based analysis by considering more realistic scenarios. We
simulate a private community that contains a number of
different ﬁles (each associated to a different swarm). Each
peer exhibits either one of two user behaviors: lazy-seeding
or over-seeding. At any time a peer can only participate in
one swarm, either as a leecher or a seeder. We do not consider
parallel leechings or seedings, or a combination of these, since
a peer who downloads and/or seeds n ﬁles simultaneously
can be considered as being n different peers, each having
1/n of the original upload capacity. In our future work, we
will consider the parallel leechings and seedings in which
a peer’s upload/download capacity is dynamically allocated
among multiple swarms.
The simulation starts with 100 initial peers. Each of them
joins a random swarm and is assigned a random number
between 0 and 2 as its sharing ratio, in a way that the average
sharing ratio for all peers is equal to 1. A peer may start a
new leeching or a new seeding process if its randomly assigned
sharing ratio is above or below the threshold, which, for lazy-
seeding peers is the SRE threshold, and for over-seeding peers
is their desired threshold. In this way we have created a steady
state for the system.
The simulation model is based on rounds. Each round
represents a unit of time in which each peer is activated and
may perform some activities, such as initiating new leeching or
seeding sessions, or uploading and/or downloading data from
other peers. In each round, leechers arrive according to a pre-
assigned arrival rate and they join a random swarm. A new
peer can start its ﬁrst download freely, after which it maintains
a sharing ratio above the threshold. Each peer attempts to
download all ﬁles, in random order. We run the simulation
for 2000 rounds and we keep a record of those peers who
ﬁnish downloading all the ﬁles by the end of the simulation.
All the results represent the average of 5 runs.
We consider three performance metrics, the average down-
loading speed, the average upload capacity utilization, and
the average seeding time. The upload capacity utilization is
calculated as the ratio between the upload speed and the upload
capacity of a peer. It reﬂects system effectiveness in utilizing
the upload capacities of peers. The average seeding time is
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Fig. 3. System performance under different fractions of lazy-seeding peers (LSP) and over-seeding peers (OSP), and different peer arrival rates.
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Fig. 4. Inﬂuence of the SRE threshold under different fractions of lazy-seeding peers (LSP) and over-seeding peers (OSP).
calculated separately for peers in different categories, like lazy-
seeding and over-seeding peers, and high-capacity and low-
capacity peers.
We always consider a bandwidth-homogeneous BitTorrent
system unless otherwise indicated. The parameter settings4
used in our simulation are introduced in Table II.
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETER SETTINGS
SRE threshold 0.7 over-seeding threshold 2
ﬁle size 10 units no. of ﬁles (swarms) 5
piece size 1 unit no. of initial peers 100
upload capacity 1 unit per round simulation rounds 2000
V. THE REWARD AND PUNISHMENT OF SRE
In this section we show the performance improvement and
deterioration under SRE. Based on simulations we examine
the inﬂuence of several parameters and we conclude the main
reasons for the reward and punishment of SRE.
A. The imbalance of bandwidth supply and demand
SRE was designed to close the gap between bandwidth de-
mand and supply as observed in public communities. However,
under SRE, the presence of over-seeding peers completely
reverses the situation and in private communities, swarms tend
to be extremely oversupplied [16], [15], [21], [8].
In our ﬁrst experiment we vary the fraction of over-seeding
peers, thus generating different levels of oversupply. As shown
4We choose 0.7 as the default value of the SRE threshold, as this value is
used in many private communities [1], [2]. And we choose 2 as the default
value of the desired threshold of over-seeding peers. We conjecture that for
different values the tendency of this problem would be the same.
in Fig. 3(a), with the fraction of over-seeding peers increasing
from 0.1 to 0.9, the average downloading speed is increased
nearly 10 times. However, the disadvantage of oversupply
is more crucial: the average upload capacity utilization is
signiﬁcantly deteriorated and the seeding time is increased
dramatically. With 50% over-seeding peers, on average each
peer can only utilize less than 20% of its upload capacity
(Fig. 3(b)). With this low upload capacity utilization, all peers
have to stay for extremely long times (compared to their
downloading times) to achieve the sharing ratio required by
SRE (Figs. 3(c) and 3(d)). In our experiment with 50% over-
seeding peers, the seeding time of a lazy-seeding peer is nearly
200 times more than its downloading time, and for over-
seeding peers, it even increases to over 400 times.
On the other hand, with a smaller peer arrival rate (which
means a smaller demand) the imbalance is even worse and so
is the performance. As shown in Fig. 3, when the peer arrival
rate decreases from 10 to 1 peer per round, with the same
fraction of over-seeding peers, the average upload capacity
utilization is decreased 2-3 times and the average seeding time
is increased 2-5 times.
Our simulation results show that, under SRE, the existence
of over-seeding peers makes the swarms oversupplied. As a
consequence, with a relatively large fraction of over-seeding
peers and a small peer arrival rate, peers have to seed for ex-
tremely long times, though their seeding is not very productive.
This is consistent with the our model results presented earlier
(Eq. (6)).
B. The inﬂuence of the SRE threshold
In this subsection we analyze the inﬂuence of varying the
SRE threshold. Fig. 4 shows that, which is consistent with our
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Fig. 5. SRE’s discrimination: without over-seeding peers (OSP).
intuition, when the SRE threshold is increased from 0.2 to 0.9,
the upload capacity utilization is decreased while the average
downloading speed and the average seeding time are increased.
Further, the reward and punishment of SRE are limited when
the fraction of over-seeding peers is small. This is consistent
with our previous results (Eq. (6) and Fig. 3).
Surprisingly, in Fig. 4(a) we see that when there are 10%
over-seeding peers, the upload capacity utilization is increased
when the SRE threshold increases from 0.2 to 0.8, and then
drops when it further increases to 0.9. We believe this is due
to, what we term as, the seeder’s dilemma: with either a very
small or a very large number of seeders, peers cannot well-
utilize their upload capacities. The former case is due to the
piece availability problem. When there are not enough seeders,
leechers have to exchange data with each other, which is not
always possible since they only hold a part of the entire ﬁle.
The latter case is due to the insufﬁcient download demand.
Without enough demand, even though seeders have the will,
they cannot ﬁnd enough leechers to upload to.
C. SRE’s discrimination against peers with limited capacities
Until now we considered only bandwidth-homogeneous
systems. However, would SRE have the same effects even in
a bandwidth-heterogeneous system, and would these effects
be the same on peers with different capacities? We answer
these questions by extending our previous experiments to
bandwidth-heterogeneous systems. More speciﬁcally, we sim-
ulate a system with two classes of peers, namely slow and
fast peers. All the other settings are the same as in previous
experiments, except that the upload capacity of slow peers is
1 unit per round and for fast peers it is 4 units per round.
1) Discrimination exists even without over-seeding peers:
We ﬁrst consider a private BitTorrent system without over-
seeding peers, and we change the fraction of fast peers from
0.1 to 0.9. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 5.
We see that fast peers barely need to do any seeding
work, but their existence increases the seeding times of slow
peers (Fig. 5(a)). This result is consistent with our previous
work [13] where we show that high-capacity peers manage
to upload considerably more during the leeching process, and
thus need to seed for shorter times. Meanwhile, consistent
with our earlier model result, Fig. 5(b) shows that the upload
capacity utilizations of both fast and slow peers do not change
much with the fraction of fast peers. However, in general
slow peers have better upload capacity utilizations. We believe
this is due to the fact that slow peers stay as seeders longer
than fast peers. Normally seeders can achieve better upload
capacity utilizations, since they are not inﬂuenced by the piece
availability problem.
While fast and slow peers both put all their effort in
participating in the community, slow peers need to seed longer.
We term this as SRE’s discrimination against low-capacity
peers. Next we show that when there are over-seeding peers,
this discrimination is even more severe.
2) Discrimination is more severe with over-seeding peers:
Similar to the results of previous bandwidth-homogeneous
experiments, Fig. 6 shows that the negative aspects of SRE
are more severe with a higher fraction of over-seeding peers.
Interestingly, with the existence of 30% over-seeding peers,
fast and slow peers now achieve similar upload capacity
utilizations (Figs. 6(a) and 6(b)). We believe this is due to the
fact that both fast and slow peers need to seed. Meanwhile,
as shown in Figs. 6(c) and 6(d), when the fraction of over-
seeding peers is increased from 0 to 30%, slow peers need to
seed 200 to 500 rounds more than fast peers, while originally
they only needed to seed 20 rounds more. In general, slow
peers need to seed 4 times as long as fast peers, which is the
same as the ratio between the upload capacity of a fast and
a slow peer. This result is exactly consistent with our model
prediction (Eq. (6)).
Clearly, the long seeding time, the low upload capacity
utilization, and the discrimination against low-capacity peers
severely deteriorate the user experience in private communi-
ties. In the following sections, we propose several strategies
to alleviate these problems.
VI. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED STRATEGIES
Inspired by ideas in social sciences and economics, in this
section we propose four strategies aimed at alleviating the
negative effects of SRE, which require only a minor revision
of the original SRE strategy.
A. Negative taxation
The idea of negative taxation is that people earning below a
certain amount receive supplemental pay from the government
[3]. As we have already shown, due to the keen competition
in uploading, peers may seed for long times, but still achieve
very low sharing ratios. We take inspiration from the concept
of negative taxation and devise a new strategy in which the
upload amount of a peer is calculated as its its actual upload
amount multiplied by coefﬁcient T deﬁned as:
T = max{min{1/SR, θ}, 1},
where SR represents the sharing ratio of a peer and θ > 1
represents the maximum negative taxation degree.
It is easy to see that a) when SR ≥ 1, T = 1, b) when
1/θ ≤ SR < 1, T = 1/SR > 1, and c) when SR ≤ 1/θ, T =
θ > 1. By using this new strategy, to gain the same sharing
ratio, poor peers (SR < 1) seed less and rich peers (SR ≥
1) seed the same amount as when using the original SRE.
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Fig. 6. SRE’s discrimination under different fractions of over-seeding peers (OSP).
The maximum negative taxation degree controls the maximum
negative taxation a peer can get, which alleviates the threat of
free-riding.
B. Welfare for the rich
The term welfare for the rich is used to describe the
bestowal of grants and tax-breaks to the wealthy [4]. Taking
inspiration from this concept, we devise another strategy to
alleviate the long seeding time, i.e., accelerating the seeding
process of an over-seeding peer by giving welfare to it. The
upload amount of a peer is calculated as its actual upload
amount multiplied by coefﬁcient W deﬁned as:
W = max{min{SR, ϕ}, 1},
where ϕ > 1 represents the maximum welfare degree.
By using this strategy, to gain the same sharing ratio,
poor peers (SR < 1) seed the same amount and rich peers
(SR ≥ 1) seed less than when using the original SRE. The
maximum welfare degree controls the maximum welfare a peer
can get, to prevent the over-seeding seeders from achieving
their desired sharing ratios too quickly.
In our simulation we choose θ = ϕ = 2. We conjecture that
for different values of θ and ϕ the tendency of performance
of the strategies would be the same.
C. Remuneration according to effort
In participatory economics, the maxim of remuneration
according to effort has been introduced [5]. Under this scheme,
people are paid according to the effort they put in rather
than the amount of contribution. Taking inspiration from
this concept, we propose the third strategy which takes into
account the effort of users in terms of their seeding times.
Previous studies have shown that the effort-based incentive
policy applied in the leeching process improves the system-
wide performance [20], [14]. We expect the same improvement
when this effort-based methodology is applied in a private
community.
More speciﬁcally, by applying SRE with counting seeding
time, a peer can start a new download when either it has
achieved the SRE threshold or it has seeded for a sufﬁciently
long time. In this way, peers that were stuck in long seeding
process in oversupplied swarms may leave and perform further
downloads. The new demand generated by these peers helps
to balance the bandwidth demand and supply in the system.
Clearly, the deﬁnition of “a sufﬁciently long period” is quite
vague. Community administrators may choose various values,
like 4 hours, 10 hours, or one day. In our simulations, we
simply assume that it equals the size of the shared ﬁle divided
by the upload capacity of a peer. It should be noted that since
over-seeding peers are deposit-oriented, they still start new
downloads only when they have achieved their desired sharing
ratios.
D. Supply-based price
According to the law of supply and demand, if the demand
remains constant and the supply increases, the price of an item
decreases and vice versa. We take inspiration from this insight
to devise our fourth strategy, i.e., SRE with supply-based price.
The basic idea is that the price a downloader needs to pay for
downloading one unit of data should be inversely correlated
with the supply in the swarm, i.e., the higher the seeder-
to-leecher ratio, the less a downloader should pay and vice
versa. In this way, in an oversupplied swarm, a leecher pays
less and potentially achieves a higher sharing ratio by the end
of its leeching process. Hence it is less likely for it to have
an insufﬁcient sharing ratio and thus stay as a seeder, which
indirectly solves the oversupply problem in this swarm. On
the other hand, in an undersupplied swarm, a leecher pays
more and potentially achieves a smaller sharing ratio, which
makes it stay as a seeder with a higher possibility than using
the original SRE. In this way, the undersupply problem is also
alleviated indirectly.
Simpliﬁed from our model result, i.e., Eqs. (7) and (11),
we use the seeder-to-leecher ratio (SLR) as a metric to
decide whether a swarm is oversupplied or undersupplied.
Community administrators can set different SLR values as
the threshold, but we simply assume that when SLR ≥ 1
the swarm is oversupplied and when SLR < 1 the swarm is
undersupplied. The download amount of a peer is calculated as
its actual download amount multiplied by coefﬁcient P deﬁned
as:
P = max{1/SLR, φ},
where φ represents the lowest price for downloading one unit
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Fig. 7. Strategy performance in alleviating the eternal seeding problem: under different fractions of lazy-seeding peers (LSP) and over-seeding peers (OSP).
of data, which is used to alleviate the threat of free-riders. In
our simulation we choose φ = 0.1.
VII. STRATEGY EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of the new
strategies proposed in Section VI. The experimental setup is
the same as in Section V and results are shown in Figs. 7 and
8.
A. Higher upload capacity utilization and shorter seeding time
From Fig. 7 we see that by using any of the new strategies,
peers achieve higher upload capacity utilizations, as well as
smaller seeding times. As shown in Fig. 7(a), when there
are 40% over-seeding peers the upload capacity utilization is
increased 2-3 times compared to using the original SRE. While
all other strategies have decreasing upload capacity utilizations
with an increasing fraction of over-seeding peers, SRE with
supply-based price performs stably. Given any fraction of over-
seeding peers, on average peers can utilize at least 40% of their
total upload capacities while for the original SRE it drops to
less than 1% when there are 90% over-seeding peers.
With the improved upload capacity utilization, the average
seeding time is reduced signiﬁcantly. As shown in Figs. 7(b)
and 7(c), when there are 60% over-seeding peers, SRE with
welfare for the rich reduces at least 10% of the original seeding
time for both lazy-seeding and over-seeding peers. SRE with
negative taxation deals with lazy-seeding peers directly, hence
it achieves an even better performance in reducing the seeding
time of lazy-seeding peers, which is a 50% improvement
compared to that achieved by SRE with welfare for the rich.
SRE with counting seeding time further relieves lazy-
seeding peers from the long seeding process in a more effective
manner. As shown in Fig. 7(b), they only need to seed for a
negligible time compared to when using the original SRE,
or either of the above two new strategies. Interestingly, by
applying SRE with counting seeding time, the seeding time of
over-seeding peers is also decreased (Fig. 7(c)), even though
they still desire the high sharing ratios as when using the
original SRE. We believe this is due to the fact that with
lazy-seeding peers ﬁnishing their seedings sooner, the upload
competition is reduced and over-seeding peers can achieve
their desired threshold more quickly. Meanwhile, when the
lazy-seeding peers are released from the seeding process, they
join other swarms as new leechers, which indirectly alleviates
the oversupply in those swarms.
Finally, the best performance in reducing the seeding time
for all peers is achieved by SRE with supply-based price. The
seeding time of both lazy-seeding and over-seeding peers is
reduced by three orders of magnitude. In our view the main
reason for the success of SRE with supply-based price is that
it adaptively adjusts the supply and demand in a swarm. When
the swarm is oversupplied, the price for downloading one unit
of data is lower and peers can ﬁnish downloads at less expense,
which directly reduces their consequent seeding amount and
hence avoids adding more seeders in this oversupplied swarm.
In this way, the imbalance of bandwidth supply and demand
is mitigated, and the strategy gives a way to escape out of
the seeder’s dilemma as described in Section V-B. A similar
argument can also be applied to an undersupplied swarm.
B. Tradeoff: slightly decreased downloading speed
By adopting any of the new strategies, while the seeding
time is dramatically reduced, as a trade-off, the average down-
loading speed is decreased (Fig. 7(d)), hence the downloading
time is increased. However, given that in our simulations we
consider ﬁles with size equal to 10 units, the increase of the
downloading time (tens of rounds) is negligible compared to
the decrease of the seeding time (hundreds or even thousands
of rounds).
C. Reduced discrimination
To examine the effectiveness of the proposed strategies in
alleviating SRE’s discrimination against peers with limited
capacities, we repeat our experiments by further considering a
bandwidth-heterogeneous system with two classes of peers,
fast and slow. From Fig. 8 we see that all the proposed
strategies effectively alleviate SRE’s discrimination against
low-capacity peers. With 30% over-seeding peers, originally
slow peers need to seed 200-500 rounds more than fast peers
do. By applying any of the new strategies, this difference is
reduced to within tens of rounds.
VIII. DISCUSSION: THE CHANGE OF USER BEHAVIOR?
It could be argued that the new strategies proposed in this
paper may trigger a change in user behavior. Speciﬁcally, users
from the two classes that we deﬁned, lazy-seeding and over-
seeding, might be incentivized to switch their classes under the
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Fig. 8. Strategy performance in alleviating discrimination: with 30% over-
seeding peers (OSP).
new strategies. It could be conjectured that as a consequence,
the system performance might be adversely affected.
However, we note that there is only a very small fraction of
strategic users in BitTorrent communities [6]. So the likelihood
of peers changing behavior is quite small. Especially regarding
over-seeding peers, we argue that in general the possibility of
such peers changing to lazy-seeding peers is quite low. This
is because we conjecture that the behavior of over-seeding
peers is motivated by either one or a combination of the
following three reasons: a) Over-seeding peers always want
to be relatively more well-off in terms of sharing ratio as
compared to average users so that they can be among the “rich
elite” of the community and gain some potential beniﬁts5; b)
They are altruists who want to help the community as much
as they possibly can; and c) They are hoarders who desire to
conserve sharing ratio for “rainy days” i.e., those time periods
when they feel they might engage in heavy downloading
activity and might as a result be expelled from the community
due to low sharing ratios.
Nevertheless, in this section we would like to analyze what
happens if users do change their behavior. We consider each
proposed strategy in turn and discuss the possible effects of
the change in user behavior.
A. SRE with negative taxation and welfare for the rich
Under SRE with negative taxation, peers with lower sharing
ratios gain sharing ratio more easily. Hence, lazy-seeding
peers have no incentive to change their behaviors, while over-
seeding peers may change to lazy-seeding peers. Similarly,
when SRE with welfare for the rich is applied, strategic lazy-
seeding peers could become over-seeding peers, while over-
seeding peers will not change their behaviors.
The worst case scenario of applying either of these two new
strategies is that all peers exhibit the same behavior, i.e., either
all peers become lazy-seeding or all become over-seeding. In
the former case every member of the community would still
be forced to maintain a minimum sharing ratio required by
SRE, i.e., every peer would continue to provide a certain level
of contribution. This outcome would still be better than the
situation in a public community where every peer has the
5Such as priority in downloading popular ﬁles, the possibility to send
invitations to others, etc. See, e.g., [1], [2].
option to leave immediately after downloading. In the latter
case, i.e., when all peers are over-seeding, it is less likely for
them to complain, since an over-seeding behavior, i.e., a desire
for higher sharing ratios, automatically implies a long seeding
time.
B. SRE with counting seeding time
Under SRE with counting seeding time, users may set their
upload speeds to zero and pretend to be seeding. However,
according to the TFT policy in BitTorrent, in an undersupplied
swarm the upload speed of a peer directly inﬂuences its
downloading speed. If a user sets its upload speed to zero,
it would hardly be able to download at reasonable speeds in
undersupplied swarms, which are normally swarms providing
new and popular content.
Further, private community administrators could set another
SRE threshold, which is smaller than the original one, and
stipulate that users who cannot achieve the original SRE
threshold must seed for a predeﬁned time, as well as achieve
the smaller SRE threshold. In this case, the potential threat of
free-riders is alleviated.
C. SRE with supply-based price
By adopting SRE with swarm-based price, the only advan-
tage that users could gain is that they may opt to download
ﬁles which have a lower price. However, this is unlikely to
happen, since the choice of ﬁle to download mainly depends
on user’s interest in the content, rather than the price. Even if
some users might be tempted to download a ﬁle simply based
on its price, this would have little inﬂuence on the performance
of SRE with swarm-based price, because this strategy is self-
organizing and will adjust the balance of supply and demand
automatically.
IX. RELATED WORK
Most existing studies on BitTorrent incentive policies focus
on TFT and its variations [9], [10], [11], [14], [17], [20].
To date, only few works have analyzed private communities.
Zhang et al. [21] investigate hundreds of private trackers and
depict a broad and clear picture of the private community
landscape. Chen et al. [8] compare system behaviors among
13 private trackers and 2 public trackers, and they show their
differences regarding user viscosity, single torrent evolution,
user behaviors, and content distribution. Liu et al. [15] also
perform measurement studies and further develop a model
to show that SRE indeed provides effective incentives, but
is vulnerable to collusion. Andrade et al. [7] focus on the
dynamics of resource demand and supply, and they show
that users typically try to increase their contribution levels by
seeding for longer and not by providing more bandwidth to
the system. However, our paper shows that providing limited
bandwidth is not the will of users, but it is a consequence
of the oversupply in private communities. While these studies
all focus on demonstrating the high seeding level achieved
by private communities, Hales et al. [12] study it from a
macroeconomic point of view and show that such communities
can suffer from problems leading to serious inefﬁciencies.
Rahman et al. [19] further study these problems in pri-
vate communities, and they provide a novel mechanism that
proactively prevents the system from seizing. Following their
ideas, our paper analyzes both the reward and punishment of
adopting SRE based on measurement, theoretical model, and
extensive simulations. Further we propose new strategies to
alleviate SRE’s punishment, which are evaluated to be very
effective through simulations.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work, with the support of real-world observations we
have provided an analytical model that captures the essence
of SRE adopted by private communities. Our model predicts
the average downloading speed, the average seeding time,
and the average upload capacity utilization for users in com-
munities that employ SRE. We extend the analysis of SRE
using extensive simulations to demonstrate its reward and
punishment. Given the existence of over-seeding user behavior,
our simulation results show that by adopting SRE, swarms
tend to be extremely oversupplied. Under this oversupply,
peers achieve high downloading speeds but with signiﬁcant
tradeoffs, which include low upload capacity utilizations and
extremely long seeding times. Under certain scenarios, a peer
may seed over 1000 times as long as its downloading time,
while on average only utilizing 1% of its upload capacity.
Further, SRE discriminates against peers with low capacities
and forces them to seed for even longer durations. To alleviate
these problems, we propose four strategies and the simulation
results show that they are all very effective. Particularly, SRE
with supply-based price, while maintaining a system-wide high
downloading speed, achieves very stable high upload capacity
utilization and reduces seeding durations by three orders of
magnitude as compared to the original SRE.
We leave the considerations of swarms with different popu-
larities and parallel leechings and/or seedings in which a peer’s
upload/download capacity is dynamically allocated among
multiple swarms, for our future work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank Prof. Dah Ming Chiu from Chinese
University of Hong Kong for his valuable advices and com-
ments. This work was supported by the Future and Emerg-
ing Technologies programme FP7-COSI-ICT of the European
Commission through project QLectives (grant no.: 231200)
and the EU FP7 project P2PNEXT (grant no.: 216217).
REFERENCES
[1] http://www.bitsoup.org
[2] http://hdchina.org
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative income tax
[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Welfare for the rich
[5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Participatory economics
[6] K. Anagnostakis, F. Harmantzis, S. Ioannidis, and M. Zghaibeh. On the
impact of practical p2p incentive mechanisms on user behavior. NET
Institute Working Paper, 2006.
[7] N. Andrade, E. Santos-Neto, F. Brasileiro, and M. Ripeanu. Resource
demand and supply in BitTorrent content-sharing communities. Com-
puter Networks, 53, 2008.
[8] X. Chen and X. Chu. Measurements, analysis and modeling of private
trackers. In Proceeding of IEEE P2P, 2010.
[9] A. L. H. Chow, L. Golubchik, and V. Nisra. Bittorrent: An extensible
heterogeneous model. In Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, 2009.
[10] B. Fan, D. M. Chiu, and J. C. Lui. The delicate tradeoffs in BitTorrent-
like ﬁle sharing protocol design. In Proceeding of IEEE ICNP, 2006.
[11] L. Guo, S. Chen, Z. Xiao, E. Tan, X. Ding, and X. Zhang. Measurements,
analysis, and modeling of BitTorrent-like systems. In Proceedings of the
5th ACM SIGCOMM Conference on Internet Measurement, 2005.
[12] D. Hales, R. Rahman, B. Zhang, M. Meulpolder, and J.A. Pouwelse.
BitTorrent or BitCrunch: Evidence of a credit squeeze in bittorrent? In
Proceeding of Wetice, 2009.
[13] A.L. Jia, L. D’Acunto, M. Meulpolder, and J.A. Pouwelse. Modeling
and analysis of sharing ratio enforcement in private BitTorrent networks.
In Proceeding of IEEE ICC, 2011.
[14] A.L. Jia, L. D’Acunto, M. Meulpolder, J.A. Pouwelse, and D.H.J.
Epema. Bittorrent’s dilemma: Enhancing reciprocity or reducing in-
equity. In Proceeding of IEEE CCNC, 2011.
[15] Z. Liu, P. Dhungel, D. Wu, C. Zhang, and K.W. Ross. Understanding
and improving incentives in private P2P communities. In Proceeding of
ICDCS, 2010.
[16] M. Meulpolder, L. D’Acunto, M. Capota, M. Wojciechowski, J.A.
Pouwelse, D.H.J. Epema, and H.J. Sips. Public and private BitTorrent
communities: A measurement study. In Proceeding of IPTPS, 2010.
[17] M. Meulpolder, J.A. Pouwelse, D.H.J. Epema, and H.J. Sips. Modeling
and Analysis of Bandwidth-Inhomogeneous Swarms in BitTorrent. In
Proceeding of IEEE P2P, 2009.
[18] D. Qiu and R. Srikant. Modeling and performance analysis of
BitTorrent-like peer-to-peer networks. In Proceeding of SIGCOMM,
2004.
[19] R. Rahman, D. Hales, T. Vinko, J.A. Pouwelse, and D.H.J. Sips. No
more crash or crunch: Sustainable credit dynamics in a P2P community.
In Proceeding of HPCS, 2010.
[20] R. Rahman, M. Meulpolder, D. Hales, J.A. Pouwelse, D.H.J. Epema,
and H.J. Sips. Improving efﬁciency and fairness in P2P systems with
effort-based incentives. In Proceeding of IEEE ICC, 2010.
[21] C. Zhang, P. Dhungel, Z. Liu Di Wu, and K.W. Ross. BitTorrent
darknets. In Proceeding of IEEE INFOCOM, 2010.
